* HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].
* x86-64 JVM on an x86-64 host.
* Version 17.0.6 or later, not at or above a version listed in FIXED_IN, and no newer than the newest releases checked (see below). Newer versions are [?]: they may carry the fix.
* The JVM reports avx512_vbmi and avx512bw, and UseAVX >= 3.
* Base64 intrinsics are on and C2/JVMCI can compile. These turn it off: -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics, -XX:DisableIntrinsic=_base64_decodeBlock, -Xint, -XX:TieredStopAtLevel below 4.
The write-up itself matches your version assumption, however it also says:
> According to Oracle, the following Oracle Java SE versions are vulnerable: 8u511b33-perf, 17.0.21.0.3, 21.0.13.0.3, 25.0.5.0.3, 27.0.1.0.3. We thank Oracle for providing this information ahead of publication time.
So according to Oracle at least, JRE8 versions are affected as well.
Wouldn't it be prudent for someone to patch even if they aren't running their code on an AVX512 system right this moment? They could be running on one.. next moment.
This looks like Claudese - may be kind to write such things yourself if you intend for humans to read them. (For example, “ HotSpot VM: any OpenJDK build, Oracle JDK, or GraalVM JDK. Only HotSpot generates the stub. OpenJ9 and GCJ are OK. Azul Prime (Zing), which replaces C2 with its own JIT, and any VM name not recognized as HotSpot are [?], never [!].” — I tried parsing at least five times before realizing you’re asking me to decipher LLM talk)
They aren’t wrong that we should be deleting more support and removing more features. The idea that the linux kernel by default builds support for all sorts of ancient systems nobody has ever heard of is absurd.
What’s that old Chinese proverb? “May you live in interesting times”? It feels like we’re living in interesting times. How long will it take for a bad actor to seriously compromise critical infrastructure? My bet is within six months.
The upside is that it’ll force legacy institutions and organizations with sub-par security to get good at security and modernize their legacy stacks. That, or get pwned in short order.
A lot of organizations we sitting on internal bugs for years because they thought they were impossible to exploit, and now their red team can break them in hours.
Most businesses are stuck in a trap now. They know the software is exploitable, but they are organizationally slow in testing and rollout. They have to start moving fast with security and IT organizations that are cut to the bone, yet at the same time contain to much box checking deadweight.
I think this bet is optimistically assuming a far more competent world than the one we actually have. Have you seen the idiot clowns actually in power? The agency that might've been tasked with this hypothetical secret scrum, CISA, has been gutted and left to rot because they thought it was an enemy plot to censor them on social media or whatever. There's no secret room where the smart people are fixing things.
Unconfirmed, but people on Twitter suggest this vulnerability has to do with the AVX512 implementation of Base64 decoding, and so this vulnerability can be worked around by running Java with the -XX:UseAVX=2 flag. (https://x.com/sean_a_cassidy/status/2122791344573976817)
I assume that the advice is referring to situations where you might have a mixture of ARM and AMD64 hosts, like on AWS, so you need to be careful about global flag updates that might not work across all instances.
It's possible if you have enough abstraction layers. At my company there are a few systems with Java runtime flags specified in the service source code, but deployment configuration in a separate infrastructure-as-code repository. Switching between CPU architectures is normally transparent if you don't rely on native code libraries.
Edit: If I understood the article correctly, the machine needs to have all the four of these flags in order to be exploitable: avx512f, avx512bw, avx512vbmi, bmi2
There are presumably more bugs lurking in the hand crafted assembly intrinsics in the JVM. The many eyeballs and shallow bugs thing is only true when the eyeballs actually understand the code.
Before you keep your security team up all night, it looks like proxies save the day here. Might not be a complete fix, obviously a real patch should be applied as soon as possible.
> Request streaming. Some current grooming profiles need partial request bodies to reach the application. A proxy that waits for the complete body removes their release timing. nginx buffers request bodies by default.
The Log4j comparison is always a little frustrating, because it sets the bar somewhere in the neighborhood of "apocalyptic". If you're someone who believes our response to serious vulnerabilities is inadequate, you can see how Log4Shell gives a lot of cover to companies.
It is wild to find a generalizable (if platform-specific) memory corruption vulnerability in Java core Base64 handling; the tornado sirens should clearly be going off. But yes, it's not as bad as Log4Shell.
There are only a bunch of commits that came in the latest merge of security fixes, and this one changed VBMI-related intrinsics code, so it's a good match for what was publicly disclosed at the time.
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.Base64;
public class Canary {
// static fields defeat escape analysis so dst/canary really live in the heap
static byte[] dst;
static byte[] canary;
public static void main(String[] args) {
// (input, expected decodedOutLength) pairs:
// 65 = "A"*64 + "=" -> fragment "=" (length 1, trailing pad)
// 66 = "A"*64 + "Q=" -> fragment "Q=" (length 2, trailing pad)
// 67 = "A"*64 + "QQ=" -> fragment "QQ=" (length 3, trailing pad)
// 68 = "A"*64 + "QQ==" -> fragment 4 bytes, well-formed control case
int[][] cases = { { 65, 50 }, { 66, 50 }, { 67, 50 }, { 68, 49 } };
byte[][] srcs = new byte[cases.length][];
for (int c = 0; c < cases.length; c++) {
int len = cases[c][0];
byte[] src = new byte[len];
Arrays.fill(src, (byte) 'A');
if (len == 65) { src[64] = '='; }
if (len == 66) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = '='; }
if (len == 67) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = 'Q'; src[66] = '='; }
if (len == 68) { src[64] = 'Q'; src[65] = 'Q'; src[66] = '=';
src[67] = '='; }
srcs[c] = src;
}
int iters = 300_000;
for (int iter = 0; iter < iters; iter++) {
for (int c = 0; c < cases.length; c++) {
byte[] src = srcs[c];
int dstLen = cases[c][1];
// fresh dst, then canary IMMEDIATELY after it in the TLAB
dst = new byte[dstLen];
canary = new byte[64];
Arrays.fill(canary, (byte) 0x41);
int before = canary.length;
try {
Base64.getDecoder().decode(src, dst);
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) {
// expected for the malformed tails
}
if (canary.length != before || changed(canary)) {
System.out.println(
"*** ITERATION " + iter + ", input length " + src.length
+ ": DESTINATION BUFFER OVERRUN DETECTED");
System.out.println(
"canary.length = " + canary.length + " (expected 64)");
System.out.println(
"canary bytes = " + toHex(canary, 48));
return;
}
}
if (iter % 50_000 == 0)
System.out.println("iter " + iter + ": clean so far");
}
System.out.println(
"no corruption detected in " + iters + " iterations");
}
static boolean changed(byte[] b) {
for (byte x : b) if (x != 0x41) return true;
return false;
}
static String toHex(byte[] b, int n) {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++)
sb.append(String.format("%02x ", b[i]));
return sb.toString();
}
}
I had to fix toHex() not to use b.length, otherwise it wouldn't print anything due to the negative array length field.
Some unverified sources have said it's in the Base64 decoder, but strangely only effecting AMD64 machines, so anything on ARM/graviton allegedly isn't impacted. Some sort of bug in some hyper-optimized code I reckon. That might mean any place that parses cookies, headers, urls, JWTs, SAML payloads, certificates, etc, might be exposed. Yikes.
But the facts aren't really out yet, we'll learn more in coming hours and days...
If I owned an entire language platform with a JIT, it would not contain assembly in its standard library, it would simply be improved until it generated something at least that fast from high-level source code on that target CPU.
This is something I really like about LLVM. Their libc isn't spilling over with hand-written assembly. It's written in straightforward C++ under the belief that the compiler does, or will do, a good job.
Looks unrelated, this is being disclosed now but it was discovered a couple of weeks ago and is just now being made public at the same time.
Also I haven't looked into it, but I'm willing to be it's some free after-use memory corruption thing that has a CVSS Attack Complexity of high, the 'RCE' is speculative, and private companies push social media headlines to fit the AI cybersecurity narrative.
Not saying the doom isn't right, but sometimes it's more like a Wednesday than doomsday. Just patch it and move on. Thanks to all involved though in disclosing and patching though.
The fact that mainstream modules have such trivial bugs in logic that can be fully covered by testing is staggering. It is about time software developers will have proper test coverage for their code, at least for basic "unit" modules. Maybe we can even name a testing philosophy to match it.
Not sure this is as trivial as it seems. The bug triggers on a specific instruction set, on a precise input length, with a specific character at the end, and when on the hot path, and requires low level memory access checking to be detected.
For the finished jre yes. But one would hope these kind of checks are also run on a hand rolled decoder function. Fuzzing that one and finding logic bugs is a lot easier
Finding these kind of bugs would have required fuzzing and some kind of bound checking canaries. Not sure all bound checkers work on the hand-optimized assembly.
Or as it turns out an LLM! Not clear whether their agent spawned any classic tools...
The exploit conditions are very specific but there are still going to be a lot of hosts impacted. We at Semgrep published some free detection scripts here: https://github.com/semgrep/detection-scripts/tree/main/CVE-2...
They look for these five conditions:
> According to Oracle, the following Oracle Java SE versions are vulnerable: 8u511b33-perf, 17.0.21.0.3, 21.0.13.0.3, 25.0.5.0.3, 27.0.1.0.3. We thank Oracle for providing this information ahead of publication time.
So according to Oracle at least, JRE8 versions are affected as well.
Or, do running machines often have their CPU changed from under them without much notice?
The upside is that it’ll force legacy institutions and organizations with sub-par security to get good at security and modernize their legacy stacks. That, or get pwned in short order.
My bet is it already happened two months ago and there's a whole secret scrum we only vaguely know about happening right now.
Most businesses are stuck in a trap now. They know the software is exploitable, but they are organizationally slow in testing and rollout. They have to start moving fast with security and IT organizations that are cut to the bone, yet at the same time contain to much box checking deadweight.
I recommend -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics instead.
Edit: If I understood the article correctly, the machine needs to have all the four of these flags in order to be exploitable: avx512f, avx512bw, avx512vbmi, bmi2
-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics to disable hardware-accelerated Base64 encoding and decoding, or
-XX:UseAVX=2 to disable AVX-512. Apply this flag only on x86-64 hosts. OpenJDK on ARM doesn't recognize it and will fail to start.
It's a heap out-of-bounds write in Java’s AVX-512 Base64 decoder.
> Request streaming. Some current grooming profiles need partial request bodies to reach the application. A proxy that waits for the complete body removes their release timing. nginx buffers request bodies by default.
https://calif.io/java4shell/#limitations
Genuine question. Everything I see is Intel all the time. I know that people at home switched to AMD, but they don't run enterprise java.
I also have been told that apparently EPYC was hyped for a while and some hosters give you that. But do corporations run the java applications there?
The name makes it sound like Log4J or the PHP thing, but from what I can tell right now, it kinda isn't all that relevant?
It is wild to find a generalizable (if platform-specific) memory corruption vulnerability in Java core Base64 handling; the tornado sirens should clearly be going off. But yes, it's not as bad as Log4Shell.
What makes it nasty is triggering it could be done so easily by url decoding, sending an email or many other things.
now panicking in case some LLM imported this without me noticing.
edit: it did. :(
There are only a bunch of commits that came in the latest merge of security fixes, and this one changed VBMI-related intrinsics code, so it's a good match for what was publicly disclosed at the time.
I had to fix toHex() not to use b.length, otherwise it wouldn't print anything due to the negative array length field. GLM had web access for this, and it was able retrieve the OpenJDK fix. I don't know if it found the reproducer in its web searches.But the facts aren't really out yet, we'll learn more in coming hours and days...
https://github.com/corretto/corretto-25/blob/25.0.5.1.2/CHAN...
`grep -ow avx512vbmi /proc/cpuinfo | sort -u`
`-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics -XX:UseAVX=2`
This is something I really like about LLVM. Their libc isn't spilling over with hand-written assembly. It's written in straightforward C++ under the belief that the compiler does, or will do, a good job.
Why do we even pay for Ubuntu?
https://www.debian.org/security/
Fortunately I run name-brand Oracle(R) Java(tm), which did publish updated packages.
Also I haven't looked into it, but I'm willing to be it's some free after-use memory corruption thing that has a CVSS Attack Complexity of high, the 'RCE' is speculative, and private companies push social media headlines to fit the AI cybersecurity narrative.
Not saying the doom isn't right, but sometimes it's more like a Wednesday than doomsday. Just patch it and move on. Thanks to all involved though in disclosing and patching though.
Or as it turns out an LLM! Not clear whether their agent spawned any classic tools...